Ali v. Rumsfeld: Challenging the President\u27s Authority to Interpret Customary International Law by Ku, Julian G.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 37 | Issue 2
2006
Ali v. Rumsfeld: Challenging the President's
Authority to Interpret Customary International
Law
Julian G. Ku
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Julian G. Ku, Ali v. Rumsfeld: Challenging the President's Authority to Interpret Customary International Law, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.
371 (2006)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/13
ALl V. RUMSFELD: CHALLENGING THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO
INTERPRET CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Julian G. Ku I
INTRODUCTION
Can a federal court override the Executive Branch's interpretation
of customary international law ("CIL")? Ali v. Rumsfeld,1 the landmark
lawsuit brought by the ACLU and Human Rights First against Donald
Rumsfeld, squarely presents this important question, which has never been
resolved by any court. By alleging that Secretary Rumsfeld violated CIL
prohibitions against torture and cruelty in the development and implementa-
tion of interrogation policies for detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Ali
plaintiffs raise a direct challenge to the Secretary's, and the President's,
interpretation of CIL.
Of course, the Ali suit also alleges violations of constitutional and
treaty law, in particular the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and the Geneva
Conventions. Each of these causes of action raises important and complex
questions in their own right. My limited goal in this symposium essay, how-
ever, is to focus on the problems created by the lawsuit's challenge to the
government's interpretation and application of CIL.
What are these problems? A judicial determination of Rumsfeld's
liability may require a federal court to override the Executive Branch's in-
terpretation of CIL. Because the Executive Branch holds the primary re-
sponsibility for the interpretation of CIL on behalf of the United States, a
judicial determination of Rumsfeld's liability could undermine the Constitu-
tion's allocation of foreign affairs powers to the President. The President's
control over the interpretation of CIL is not only reflected in the Constitu-
tion's text and structure but also in judicial precedent and historical practice.
Moreover, as a purely functional matter, the Executive Branch holds a sub-
stantial comparative advantage over the courts in the interpretation of CIL,
especially as that CIL is implemented in policies otherwise within the au-
thority of the Executive Branch.
I Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Michael Scharf for inviting him to participate in this symposium and the
editors of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law for their assistance in
editing this article for publication.
1 Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-01201, 2005 WL 922428 (N.D.III. Apr. 8, 2005).
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Indeed, the limited factual record that is publicly available suggests
that the Defense Department made a good faith effort to apply CIL in the
development of policies for the interrogation of detainees. Defense Depart-
ment officials were required to make difficult and complex determinations
about the nature of particular interrogation techniques based on a variety of
complex factors related to military objectives and foreign policy. It is hard
to see how federal courts are well-positioned to second-guess these complex
policy determinations.
To be sure, the Executive Branch's administration of interrogation
policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay has been deeply flawed.
As a legal matter, officials like Secretary Rumsfeld may well have violated
the Constitution and relevant international treaties by authorizing, permit-
ting or failing to prevent such abuses. But these failures and mistakes should
not blind us to the broader structural point: federal courts do not, and should
not, have the legal authority to override the Executive Branch's interpreta-
tion of CIL.
Part I of the essay will briefly summarize the legal and factual basis
of the Ali lawsuit. It explains how much of the Ali plaintiffs' case depends
upon the idea that a federal court can override the Executive Branch's own
interpretation of CIL. Part II then sets forth my doctrinal claim: the Execu-
tive Branch's interpretation of CIL is binding on courts on matters within its
constitutional authority absent congressional action to the contrary. Part III
then applies this approach to the Ali lawsuit. It argues that, at least based on
the limited factual record available, the Defense Department's interpretation
of CIL as part of its development of policies governing the interrogation of
detainees, cannot be rejected by a federal court hearing the Ali plaintiffs'
claims.
I. ALLEGING A TORT IN VIOLATION OF THE "LAW OF NATIONS"
The ACLU and Human Rights First rightly hailed their lawsuit
against Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other defense
department officials as a landmark lawsuit. In contrast to most of the other
lawsuits filed in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the U.S.
response to those attacks, this suit directly challenges the legality of a high-
level Executive Branch official's implementation of policies deemed crucial
to the prosecution of the war on terrorism.
2
2 See Ali, 2005 WL 922428. See also Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-CV-00249, 2004 WL
2410405 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004); Tim Harper, Arar Deportation 'Within Law": Ashcroft,
TORONTO SUN, Nov. 21, 2003, at A13. For a discussion of this and other cases against the
executive, see Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terror-
ism, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105, 110-14 (2005).
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A. The Allegations
The Ali lawsuit alleges that Rumsfeld and his subordinates in the
Defense Department "authorized, ratified, or failed to stop" the use of coer-
cive techniques in the interrogation of detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan.3 In
particular, Rumsfeld "was directly and personally" involved in setting inter-
rogation rules, and exercised his power to allow "illegal practices, namely,
the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees in
U.S. custody."4
The lawsuit has three main sets of allegations. The first set of
allegations focuses on Rumsfeld's "policies, patterns, or practices governing
the detention and interrogation of detainees in Afghanistan or Iraq" and
alleges that these "policies, patterns, or practices" caused the torture and
inhumane treatment of the plaintiffs. 5 The second set of allegations center
around Rumsfeld's "knowledge of torture and abuse of detainees."6 The
third set of allegations charge that Rumsfeld failed to act upon his
knowledge of the abuses to stop the torture and mistreatment of the
plaintiffs. 7
The specific allegations of torture, abuse, or inhumane treatment
include "severe and repeated beatings, cutting with knives, sexual
humiliation and assault, confinement in a wooden box, forcible sleep and
sensory deprivation, mock executions, death threats, and restraint in
contorted and excruciating positions."8
B. The Causes ofAction
The Ali plaintiffs' claims of torture, abuse, and inhumane treatment
allege violations of three types of law cognizable in federal courts: U.S.
constitutional law, treaties, and CIL.
First, the plaintiffs argue that their mistreatment violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United State Constitution and
the prohibitions against Cruel and Unusual Punishment contained in the
Fifth and Eighth Amendments. 9 The complaint alleges that the Due Process
3 Complaint at para. 203, Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-01201, 2005 WL 922428 (N.D.II1.
Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://humanrightsfirst.com////uslaw/etn/lawsuit/PDF/rums-com
plaint-022805.pdf [hereinafter Ali Complaint].
4 Consolidated Amended Complaint, Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-1378, 2005 WL
37263f00 (D.D.C. Jan. 5 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06105-
etn-rums-complaint.pdf [hereinafter Ali Amended Complaint].
Ali Complaint, supra note 3, paras. 43, 45-71.
6 Id. paras. 72-116.
7 Id paras. 117-138.
8 Id. para. 1.
9 See id. paras. 194-205; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20061
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Clause of the Fifth Amendment "prohibits any person acting under the color
of U.S. law from engaging in or allowing torture, abuse or other treatment
that 'shocks the conscience"' 10 and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments prohibits "any person under the
color of U.S. law from engaging in or allowing torture, or other cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment that constitutes deprivation of basic human
needs such as food and reasonable safety, and the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain . . . ." The complaint also alleges that Rumsfeld's "ac-
tions, orders, authorizations, approvals and omissions caused the torture and
abuse of plaintiffs ... and [gave] rise to a cause of action for damages...
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics." 12
Second, the plaintiffs argue that their mistreatment violates provi-
sions in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, especially Common
Article 3.13 This provision, which is contained in several treaties signed and
ratified by the U.S. government, requires that U.S. military personnel to
avoid any "violence to life and person ... [including] cruel treatment and
torture."' 4
Third, and most importantly for the purposes of this essay, the
plaintiffs argue that their abuse constitutes a violation of CIL, in particular
the CIL of human rights.' 5 The plaintiffs seek damages pursuant to the
Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 16 which is permitted pursuant to the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 17 In Sosa, the Supreme
Court kept the door of federal courts ajar for violations of well-settled
norms of CIL.' 8
Although the violations of CIL constitute only one of the Ali plain-
tiffs' four causes of action, they may well prove to be the least difficult path
to the plaintiffs' success in their lawsuit. At least one court has held that the
Geneva Conventions are not self-executing as a matter of domestic U.S.
10 Ali Complaint, supra note 3, para. 195.
" Id. para. 202.
12 Id. para. 197 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
13 Id. paras. 215-18. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
14 Geneva III, supra note 13, art. 3(a).
15 Ali Complaint, supra note 3, paras. 206-14, 2!9-22.
16 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
17 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
18 See id.
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law. 19 Proving a constitutional violation of the Fifth or Eighth Amendments
also faces serious evidentiary and legal obstacles. For instance, the plain-
tiffs' most difficult factual claim will be proving that Secretary Rumsfeld
knew or should have known of the levels of abuse occurring in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed in their constitutional
claims if they cannot prove that difficult factual claim.
In contrast, the plaintiffs can argue that Rumsfeld's mere authoriza-
tion of certain aggressive procedures, such as the use of "stress positions",
constitutes a violation of CIL .20 CIL arguably requires Rumsfeld to refrain
from authorizing any actions deemed to be cruel, inhuman, or degrading.
For this reason, the Ali plaintiffs will likely rely heavily on their CIL cause
of action as their lawsuit moves forward.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF CIL
Although the Supreme Court has recently indicated that CIL should
be considered a type of federal law,2' it did not decide which branch of the
federal government holds the authority to issue binding interpretations of
CIL. In this part, I argue that the Executive Branch, and not the federal
courts, controls the interpretation and application of CIL on behalf of the
United States.22
A. CIL and the Constitution
The status of CIL in domestic U.S. law has been the subject of sub-
stantial debate and uncertainty.23 One of the reasons for this uncertainty is
19 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert granted, 126 S. Ct. 622
(2005).
20 See Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 286 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Working Group Report].
21 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
22 This section advances an argument John Yoo and I have developed at greater length
elsewhere. See Julian G. Ku & John C. Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Func-
tional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REv. 153 (2004).
23 The literature on this question is voluminous and can be divided in to three camps. One
group holds that CIL is part of the Laws of the United States under both Article III and Arti-
cle VI. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as
Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393 (1997). Another group holds that CIL is
not federal law under either Article III or Article VI. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Mod-
ern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997); Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal
Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 38-44 (1995). Finally, one group
splits the difference holding the CIL is federal law for purposes of Article III but not for
2006]
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that the text of the Constitution mentions CIL only once. Article I, Section
Eight authorizes Congress to "define and punish ... Offences against the
Laws of Nations.,, 24 This under-used and understudied provision might give
Congress the exclusive power to interpret or recognize CIL.25 But, neither
historical materials nor judicial interpretation of this provision has sup-
ported this reading.26
Rather, the majority view of courts and commentators is that even if
Congress has not codified CIL as federal statutory law, CIL is still cogniza-
ble by federal courts as part of the common law. This view holds that CIL
should be understood as incorporated into the phrase "Laws of the United
States" in Articles III and VI of the Constitution. 27 As such, claims of CIL
violations would properly fall within the federal courts' subject matter ju-
risdiction under Article 11128 and would also preempt inconsistent state law
under Article VI.
29
As noted in a series of articles, however, the incorporation of CIL
as federal law is unsupported by any judicial precedent prior to the 1980s,
nor is it required by any convincing evidence of the original intent of the
drafters of the Constitution. 30 Indeed, early historical documents and subse-
quent judicial precedent actually support the view that CIL forms part of the
general common law that was not exclusive to either federal or state
courts. 31
Article VI. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Non-Preemptive Federal
Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 555, 560 (2002).
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
25 The lone recent study of the clause can be found in Beth Stephens, Federalism and
Foreign Affairs: Congress 's Power to "Define and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of
Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REv 447 (2000).
26 See id. at 477-83 (noting examples of instances where the Supreme Court has "applied
an evolving notion of the law of nations").
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1987). The Restatement is
published by the American Law Institute and is generally accepted to reflect the views of
leading scholars and practitioners on important areas of law.
28 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
29 Although no court has preempted state law using CIL, there is some academic support
for this view. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 reporters' note 3
(1987).
30 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 819; Weisburd, supra note 23, at 38-
44.
31 I have discussed the "CIL as general common law" view extensively in Julian G. Ku,
Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 265, 271-91 (2001). This
question has been the subject of substantial commentary elsewhere as well, and despite some
aggressive claims by scholars such as Professor Paust, as in Jordan J. Paust, Customary In-
ternational Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 301, 301-02 n.4 (1999). Most other scholars have conceded that that CIL was understood
[Vol. 37:371
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As a historical matter, federal and state courts have applied CIL as
part of their interpretation of the general common law. This body of law
was applicable in both federal and state courts, but it constituted neither
federal nor state law. The "CIL as common law" understanding is further
strengthened by judicial precedent. 32
Still, the status of CIL as domestic law remained unsettled in the
courts until the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa.3 3 Although the Court did
not explicitly address the status of CIL, it assumed that CIL could be, in
limited circumstances, cognizable in federal courts, even in cases where
diversity of citizenship did not exist. 34 While endorsing CIL as a form of
federal law, the Court did not elaborate on either the textual or precedential
basis for this holding. It also did not endorse using CIL as the basis for fed-
eral question jurisdiction. This means that CIL might remain a unique form
of federal law that can only be invoked pursuant to the ATS and in no other
context.
35
B. CIL and the Executive Branch
Despite the scholarly attention paid to judicial determinations of
CIL, neither federal nor state courts have been the primary expositors of
CIL in the U.S. system. Rather, the Executive Branch is the institution most
responsible for administering, interpreting, and applying CIL. As a textual
matter, this power flows from the Constitution's vesting of the "executive
power" in the President in Article II of the Constitution along with the gen-
eral responsibility to conduct foreign affairs including the power to make
treaties, appoint diplomats, and to command the military.36 Because CIL is
traditionally determined by state practice and administering foreign policy
as a form of general common law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 111 (1987); Stephens, supra note 23, at 400-01, 401 n.34.
32 See, e.g., Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 266 U.S. 580
(1924); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286
(1876).
33 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720, 728-730 (2004) (adopting the historical
inference that the Alien Tort Statute, enacted by the First Congress, must have contemplated
"that some, but, few, torts in violation of the law of nations were understood to be within the
common law.").
34 See id. at 731 n.19.
35 Id. ("[W]e know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction was extended
[to other CIL] subject to any comparable congressional assumption.").
36 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (containing the most powerful statement of the view that
the President controls all foreign affairs matters not specifically allocated to Congress due to
the Constitution's allocation of "executive power" to the President in Article II). See Curtis
A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102
MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) (critiquing the historical foundations of this view).
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requires the President's administration of state practice, the President has
typically been responsible for the interpretation, application, and recogni-
tion of CIL on behalf of the United States.
One of the best examples of Presidential assertion of the CIL power
occurred in 1948 when President Harry Truman unilaterally declared that
the United States claimed rights over the undersea continental shelf pursu-
ant to the customary law of the sea.37 This order extended U.S. claims over
thousands of square miles of undersea territory and arguably modified the
existing CIL of the sea.38 Yet, the President's power to issue such a declara-
tion accepting CIL rules on behalf of the United States has never been seri-
ously questioned by any court. President Ronald Reagan made a similar
declaration in 1983 when he accepted, on behalf of the United States, most
(but not all) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty rules as CIL binding on the
United States.39
Domestic courts have treated the President's views on CIL as bind-
ing. For instance, courts have given absolute deference to the executive's
views of the proper application of the law of foreign sovereign immunity
40
prior to Congress's codification of the law of foreign sovereign immunity in
1975.41 Deference has continued in those areas that Congress failed to cod-
ify.
42
Scholars have debated whether the Executive is "bound" by CIL
under his duties to "take care" that the laws be faithfully executed.43 The
leading case on the subject, The Paquete Habana,44 contemplates a power
by the executive to issue "controlling executive acts" to override a court's
application of CIL. 45 Although the executive might be bound as a matter of
international law, on this understanding of the case, no domestic court has
the authority to require the executive to comply with a CIL rule. Although
37 See Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and
Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303
(Oct. 2, 1945).
3 See id.
39 See Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, Proclamation No. 5030,
48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983).
40 See, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); F.W. Stone Eng'g Co. v. Petroleous
Mexicanos, 42 A.2d 57, 59-60 (Pa. 1945).
41 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
sovereign immunity for Panamanian leader on grounds that Executive Branch "has mani-
fested its clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied head-of-state immunity").
43 See Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L.
REv. 1205, 1239-40 (1988) (arguing that the President is not bound by CIL under his duty to
take care that the law is faithfully executed).
44 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
41 Id. at 700.
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recent scholarship has contested this understanding of the case, 46 the Execu-
tive Branch seems to have adopted this view.47 Moreover, no court has di-
rectly addressed this issue since The Paquete Habana case. The most recent
Supreme Court decision on CIL in Sosa merely noted in a footnote that the
Executive Branch's views on the foreign policy effects of hearing an ATS
case should be given substantial deference, but it did not squarely address
the significance of the executive's interpretation of CIL.48
C. Functional Advantages of Executive Control over CIL
Even putting aside these doctrinal arguments, the Executive Branch
appears to have a number of functional advantages over courts in the inter-
pretation and administration of CIL. Due to his role as central representative
of the nation in its international relations, the President develops and an-
nounces foreign policy, communicates with other nations, and negotiates
and signs international agreements. Presidents also have foreign affairs
powers that allow them to reach a variety of informal agreements and com-
mitments with other nations. Given the President's role as chief spokesman
and treaty-maker for the United States, allowing him to control recognition,
acceptance and interpretation of CIL rules seems a sensible complement to
his powers.
Indeed, division of control over CIL between the courts and the Ex-
ecutive Branch might send conflicting signals to other nations about U.S.
views of CIL. Suppose the United States sought to wage a war that arguably
violates the prohibition on the use of force contained in the U.N. Charter
and in CIL. 49 An alien harmed by American military action in the war could
bring an ATS suit against the U.S. government or individual members of the
government and armed forces alleging the war and its conduct violated CIL.
Judicial decisions to adopt a different rule of CIL through the ATS would
conflict with the interpretation of CIL adopted by the Executive Branch.
46 See Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary Inter-
national Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321 (1985).
47 See, e.g., Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override Customary or
Other International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 163, 170-71 (1989) (discussing whether Congress and the executive can
override CIL).
48 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 n.20 (2004).
49 For a discussion of the international legal rules governing the use of force, see John
Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004). See also Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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D. Summary
In sum, historical practice and judicial doctrine strongly suggest
that regardless of the status of CIL as domestic law, the President is the
chief administrator of CIL on behalf of the United States. Absent congres-
sional intervention, the President holds the power to accept or reject CIL
rules on behalf of the United States and to make his interpretations binding
on federal and state courts. This approach also coincides with the Presi-
dent's functional advantages in the interpretation and administration of CIL.
III. THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES ON
DETAINEE INTERROGATION
What are the consequences of the President's control over the inter-
pretation of CIL? It means that when the President or his authorized subor-
dinates issue a definitive interpretation of CIL, courts must defer to that
interpretation. Acceptance of this view does not necessarily require a court
to dismiss the Ali plaintiffs' claims under CIL. If the evidence shows, how-
ever, that Secretary Rumsfeld's development and implementation of coer-
cive interrogation policies did not violate an interpretation of CIL adopted
by either the President or by Congress, then the court should dismiss that
portion of the lawsuit.
In this part, I review the available evidence detailing Rumsfeld's
approval of new and more coercive interrogation policies. 50 Based on the
limited public record, it appears that Rumsfeld approved those policies with
an understanding that the policies did not violate CIL, as interpreted by the
President. If these documents provide an accurate factual record of Rums-
feld's decisionmaking process, I believe that his approvals of coercive inter-
rogation techniques are not a violation of CIL.
A. Rumsfeld's Approval of Coercive Interrogation Policies
The Ali complaint focuses heavily on Rumsfeld's actions during the
fall of 2002 through the spring of 2003 in the development of new and more
coercive policies to interrogate detainees in Guantanamo Bay.5t During that
period, senior military officers responsible for interrogations in Guantanamo
Bay requested Rumsfeld's approval of certain highly coercive interrogation
50 I put aside for now the complaint's allegations of Rumsfeld's complicity in violating
these policies because the facts on which those allegations are based are likely to remain in
serious dispute.
51 See Ali Complaint, supra note 3.
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techniques that were not authorized by the Army's existing rules and regula-
tions governing detainee interrogation.
52
On December 2, 2002, Rumsfeld approved some, but not all, of the
new more coercive techniques.5 3 He rescinded that approval six weeks later
on January 15, 2003 and appointed a working group to study the policy and
legality implications of such interrogation techniques.54 This working group
issued a recommendation supporting the legality and utility of most of the
coercive techniques. 5 On April 16, 2003, Rumsfeld then gave approval of
some, but again not all, of the recommended coercive techniques. 56 Al-
though the policies approved were supposedly directed only at detainee
interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, the lawsuit alleges that these policies
were also implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan.57
What types of coercive interrogation policies did Rumsfeld ap-
prove? In December 2002, Rumsfeld approved 17 techniques recommended
by the Department of Defense's ("DOD") general counsel. 58 These tech-
niques were divided into three categories. 59 The two Category I techniques
consisted of verbal techniques, such as yelling at the detainee. 60 The 12
Category II techniques were far more coercive, including:
" The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours
" The use of an isolation facility for up to 30 days
52 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., DoD Provides Details on Interrogation Process (June
22, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040622-0930.html.
53 Memorandum from William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def. to Donald
Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def., Counter-resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc5.pdf [hereinafter
Haynes November 27, 2002 Memo] (containing approval signature of Donald Rumsfeld on
December 2, 2002).
54 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. to William J.
Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Interrogations (Jan. 15, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc6.pdf [hereinafter Rumsfeld
January 15, 2003 Memo].
55 Working Group Report, supra note 20.
56 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. to Commander,
U.S. Southern Command, Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (Apr. 16,
2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc9.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Rumsfeld April 16, 2003 Memo].
57 See Ali Complaint, supra note 3.
58 Haynes November 27, 2002 Memo, supra note 52 (containing approval signature of
Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002).
59 Memorandum from Jerald Phifer, Dir., J2 to Michael E. Dunlavey, Commander, Dep't
of Def. Joint Task Force 170, Request for Approval of Counter-resistance Techniques (Oct.
11, 2002), available at http://www.npr.org/documents/2004/dod_prisoners/20040622doc3.pd
f.
60 See id.
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" Deprivation of light auditory or light stimuli
* Placing a hood over detainee during transportation and questioning
* Removal of clothing
* Forced grooming
" Using detainee phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress. 61
The four Category III techniques were by far the most coercive. These tech-
niques included:
* Use of scenarios designed to convince detainee that death or severely
painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family
" Exposures to cold weather or water
" Use of a wet towel or dripping water to induce the misperception of
suffocation
* Use of mild, non-injurious contact such as grabbing, poking in the
chest with the finger, and light pushing.
62
Based on the recommendations of his general counsel and other ad-
visers, on December 2, 2002, Rumsfeld approved all of the recommended
techniques in Categories I and II but only the last technique ("mild, non-
injurious contact") in Category 111.63 Use of any other Category III tech-
niques required Rumsfeld's personal approval. 64
On January 15, 2003, Rumsfeld rescinded his December 2, 2002
approvals and referred the question of interrogation techniques to a working
group. 65 The working group recommended 35 techniques as legally permis-
sible and beneficial as a matter of policy. 66 Rumsfeld approved 24 of these
techniques, but required his personal approval for use of four of the tech-
niques. 67 The four techniques requiring pre-approval were described as:
" Giving incentives to the detainee
* Insulting the pride or ego of the detainee
" Use of a "Mutt and Jeff" or "good cop, bad cop" interrogation ap-
proach
61 See id.
62 Id.
63 Haynes November 27, 2002 Memo, supra note 52 (containing approval signature of
Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002).
6 See id.
63 Rumsfeld January 15, 2003 Memo, supra note 53.
66 Working Group Report, supra note 20, at 341-43.
67 Rumsfeld April 16, 2003 Memo, supra note 55.
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* Isolation
68
The final April 2003 rules did not include most of the Category II
techniques or any of the most serious Category III techniques. 69 Thus, au-
thorization for the use of stress positions, the removal of clothing, forced
grooming, or the use of phobias was rescinded. However, the rules did per-
mit the following physically coercive techniques:
" Dietary and environmental manipulation
" Sleep adjustment (but not deprivation)
" "False flag" 70
B. The President's Interpretation of CIL Governing Detainee Inter-
rogations
In giving approval to these policies, Rumsfeld and his subordinates
consulted attorneys for advice on the legality of the more coercive tech-
niques. The most comprehensive analysis of the advice released publicly is
contained in the report of the Detainee Working Group appointed by Rums-
feld in January 2003 to review detainee policies. This advice concluded that
almost all of the coercive interrogation policies being proposed would not
violate CIL as interpreted by the U.S.
1. The Binding Effect of Customary International Law
Following advice from the Department of Justice, the Detainee
Working Group concluded that "any Presidential decision in the current
conflict concerning the detention and trial of al-Qaida or Taliban militia
prisoners would constitute a 'controlling' Executive act that would immedi-
ately and completely override any customary international law.'
1
This approach is mostly consistent with the theory of Presidential
control over CIL delineated in Part 11.72 If the President does control the
interpretation and acceptance of CIL on behalf of the United States, than he
may reject rules of CIL such as the CIL rules restraining the conduct of de-
tainee interrogations.
68 Cf Working Group Report, supra note 20, at 341-43 with Rumsfeld April 16, 2003
Memo, supra note 55.
69 Cf Working Group Report, supra note 20, at 341-43 with Rumsfeld April 16, 2003
Memo, supra note 55.
70 Cf Working Group Report, supra note 20, at 341-43 with Rumsfeld April 16, 2003
Memo, supra note 55.
71 Working Group Report, supra note 20, at 243.
72 See supra Part.II.
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On the other hand, the Department of Justice and Detainee Working
Group report assumed that any "decision" made by the President and his
subordinates with respect to detainee interrogations would automatically
reflect a considered interpretation of CIL or a rejection of a CIL norm. The
truth of this assumption is far from evident in the publicly released docu-
ments.
In fact, the only evidence of the Executive Branch's careful consid-
eration of CIL in the context of specific decisions about detainee interroga-
tions is found in the Detainee Working Group Report. That report analyzed
the applicability of CIL norms, even though it operated under the assump-
tion that none of those norms provided "legally-enforceable restrictions" on
the U.S. 7 3 Nonetheless, the Working Group Report did conduct a more spe-
cific inquiry on the applicability of CIL. As I will explain, they concluded
that none of the interrogation policies proposed would violate CIL as ac-
cepted and interpreted by the U.S.
2. The Detainee Working Group Report's Application of CIL to De-
tainee Interrogations.
The Report reviewed six major sources of CIL that might apply to
the interrogation of detainees: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the American Convention on Human Rights, the Declaration on the Protec-
tion of all Persons from being Subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the First Additional Protocol
to the Geneva Conventions, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War. 74
All of these sources of CIL pose potential restrictions on detainee
interrogations. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the American
Convention on Human Rights, and the Declaration on Protection of all Per-
sons from being Subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment all provide broad proscriptions of "torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. ' '75 The Geneva Con-
ventions provide more specific protections for individuals detained by the
military including a prohibition of "physical and mental torture, outrages
73 Working Group Report, supra note 20, at 344.
14 Id. at 338-39.
75 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948); Organization of American States, Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;
Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from being Subjected to Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452(XXX), U.N. Doc. A/10034
(Dec. 9, 1975).
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upon personal dignity .... " and a general requirement of humane treat-
ment.76
The Working Group then proceeded to analyze specific interroga-
tion techniques within the context of these documents, prior U.S. state-
ments, and other country's views.77 Although they labeled their considera-
tion of foreign country views as "policy," for the purpose of developing
detainee policies, 78 assessing the requirements of CIL is a type of policy
determination.
Thus, the Report pointed out a number of techniques as creating po-
tential conflict with other nations views of the protections provided to de-
tainees. 79 These techniques included non-physical techniques such as:
" Incentive or Removal - Providing a reward or removing a privilege
" Pride and Ego Down - Attacking or insulting the ego of a detainee, not
beyond the limits of what would apply to a POW
* Mutt and Jeff - A team consisting of a friendly and harsh interroga-
tor
80
Additionally, the Report noted that the following physical
techniques could also be found to clash with other countries' views and
recognized CIL:
* Environmental Manipulation - Altering the environment to create
moderate discomfort. Conditions would not be such that they would injure
detainee
a Isolation - Isolating detainees from other detainees while still comply-
ing the basic standards of treatment
" Forced Grooming -Forcing detainee to shave hair or beard
" Sleep Deprivation - Keeping detainee awake for an extended period of
time not to exceed 4 days in succession
* Face or Stomach Slap - A quick glancing slap to fleshy part of the
cheek or stomach
* Removal of Clothing - Potential removal of all clothing
* Increasing Anxiety by Use of Aversions - Introducing factors that cre-
ate anxiety but do not create terror or mental trauma (i.e. simple presence
of a dog without directly threatening action) 81
76 Geneva III, supra note 13; Geneva IV, supra note 13.
77 See Working Group Report, supra note 20.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 341-43.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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Although the Working Group Report did not find that any of these
techniques violated CIL, their recommendation did note that other countries,
and international institutions like the International Criminal Court, might
very well hold that such techniques violate CIL.
82
Perhaps for this reason, the Working Group recommended that the
less physically coercive techniques (including environmental manipulation)
should be approved for use against detainees outside the U.S. 83 It then rec-
ommended that the most coercive techniques, most of which it also noted
could be considered a violation of CIL by other nations, be subject to excep-
tional circumstances and require the approval of senior military officials.
84
In any event, Secretary Rumsfeld did not fully accept the Report's
recommendations and simply rejected the most coercive techniques includ-
ing sleep deprivation, removal of clothing, and use of aversions. 85 He also
limited the use of the certain techniques that may be seen as violations of
CIL, including isolation, to situations where his personal approval had been
provided.86
This limited public record does not reflect broad disregard for CIL.
Rather, it demonstrates that the DOD, acting on behalf of the President,
interpreted and rejected CIL rules governing the interrogation of detainees.
In fact, it may have been concerns about CIL that convinced Secretary
Rumsfeld to prohibit the use of the most coercive techniques.
CONCLUSION
The question is not whether there is a role for civilian courts in re-
viewing the legality of U.S. detainee interrogation policies. Courts have the
duty and the authority to find members of the Executive Branch liable for
violations of relevant constitutional, statutory, and treaty law.
CIL, however, presents a different issue. The President is author-
ized (subject to congressional oversight) to interpret and reject particular
norms of CIL on behalf of the U.S. Courts cannot, and should not, wield
power over CIL to override the President's interpretation or application of
those principles to matters within his constitutional authority. That power is
held by Congress.
The DOD's study and development of policies for the interrogation
of detainees is one of those matters. The DOD's decision-makers did appear
to consider the legality of these policies under the President's interpretation
of CIL as well as under the views of CIL that might be adopted by foreign
82 Id. at 338-39.
83 Id. at 346-347.
84 Id.
85 Rumsfeld April 16, 2003 Memo, supra note 55.
86 Id.
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states. They reasonably concluded that the use of certain coercive interroga-
tion policies did not violate U.S. understandings of CIL, but that some of
the policies might be considered violations of CIL by other countries.
For these reasons, I believe that no federal court will, or should, re-
verse the DOD's interpretation of CIL in this instance. The Ali plaintiffs
may ultimately prevail in their suit, but they will not prevail by convincing a
federal court to override the President's authority to interpret CIL.

